The Civil Contingencies Bill 2020, intended to update the Manx emergency powers regime following the 2020 state of Emergency, has now been published, and is open for consultation. This is my response to this initial draft of the Bill.
The proposed Bill is based partly upon UK legislation – the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. The principal provisions of the UK Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (as amended) which are used as a model for the Manx Bill are: s.1, s.20, s.21, s.22, s.23, s.26, s.27, s.28, s.30 and s.31.
There are significant advantages to taking foreign legislation as a starting point. Considerable time and effort has already been put into the drafting process, making adoption comparatively quick and cost-effective. For UK models in particular, the legal context will often be similar in the Isle of Man and the UK, allowing for relatively easy transplantation of the UK legislation – especially where the legislation is making changes to an area where UK legislation has already formed the model for the Isle of Man. Where the legislation has been in effect for some time, it may be possible to draw upon insights from how it has worked in practice, or a body of commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of the legislation, in developing the Manx version. In this case, there is no important case-law, and – apart from a substantial text by Walker and Broderick – little commentary, on the relevant provisions of the UK Act.
Adoption can also have two significant weaknesses. Firstly, in adopting an established UK model, it may be too easy to assume that the model is a sound one, and so legislation may not be subject to sufficiently rigorous scrutiny in the Manx legislative process. We have an example of this in relation to the Emergency Powers Act 1936, where a significant change in the 1960s was made with strikingly little legislative debate – less than 1/3 that of the contemporaneous Public Lavatories (Turnstiles) Bill. Secondly, the legislation may be insufficiently sensitive to differences between the Manx and the UK context. This may be particularly important where, as in this case, the legislation is of a constitutional nature.
My response to the consultation will address two distinct issues: (1) The extent to which the Manx Bill fails to reflect significant differences between the Manx and UK contexts, in particular the challenges posed by emergency powers in a small island democracy; (2) The extent to which the Manx Bill does not take account of lessons which can be learnt from the Manx history of emergency powers, both in relation to the twentieth century development of the Emergency Powers Act, and the state of Emergency of 2020.
1. Significant characteristics of the Manx Context.
A significant feature of the Manx context is the concentration of power in, in absolute terms, a small number of persons. The Bill, even compared with the EPA, exacerbates this.
The creation of Emergency Regulations under the Bill.
The powers under the EPA were exercised by the “Governor in Council”, that is the Governor on the advice and with the concurrence of the Council of Ministers. Previous discussion of the EPA had queried whether the Governor should have any role in the regime, questioning why the powers were not exercised by the Council of Ministers. At one point the Bill appears to be giving a similar priority to the Council of Ministers. Part 2 of the Bill states that the Council of Ministers “is to co-ordinate the planning, organization and implementation generally of measures which are designed to guard against, prevent, reduce, mitigate or overcome the effects or possible effects of any emergency happening” (clause 4). It also has a clause dealing with the exercise of powers or functions by the Council of Ministers, allowing exercise of “any power or function conferred under this Act on the Council of Ministers” by any two or more Ministers, subject to ratification within seven days by the Council of Ministers (clause 5).
The detail of Clause 5 paves the way for a strong role for CoMin, as the centre of the Manx government, in the exercise of emergency powers (as opposed to the function outlined in clause 4). It is surprising, therefore, when the Bill does not give any further powers to CoMin. In relation to powers, Clause 5 would appear only to apply to powers created by Emergency Regulations under the Act, as the only substantive power in the Act – the ability to create Emergency Regulations – is vested not in the CoMin but in the Cabinet Office: “the Cabinet Office may make emergency regulations” (clause 7(1)).
Who is the Cabinet Office? The Cabinet Office was formerly the Chief Secretary’s Office. In 2014, when the office was renamed, an Act of Tynwald made a number of changes to legislation. The Cabinet Office (Legislative Amendments) Act 2014 makes a number of specific amendments to earlier legislation, and provides that “a reference in any enactment to the Chief Secretary’s Office is to be taken as a reference to the Cabinet Office”. (s.6(1)). The Chief Secretary was central to the 2020 response, signing EPRs. This was not because the Cabinet Office had the power to create EPRs, but rather because the Chief Secretary may sign public documents on behalf of the Governor in Council or the Council of Ministers (Interpretation Act 2015 s.74(1)).
In a practical sense, the Cabinet Office is bound to have an important role in responding to an emergency. Its remit includes “leading the development, co-ordination and application of policies that will affect more than one department”, and “giving impartial advice and services to the Chief Minister, the Council of Ministers, and to his Excellency the Lieutenant Governor”. This is very different from creating Emergency Regulation itself. The proposed Bill will replace the EPA focus on the Governor in Council – in practice, the Council of Ministers – with one on the Cabinet Office. In sharp contrast to the Council of Ministers, only one individual responsible to Tynwald is, by definition, a member of Cabinet Office: the Minister for the Cabinet Office, currently a post held by the Chief Minister.
As a further concentration of power in a small democracy, this is an undesirable. It would be better to keep the power to make Emergency Regulations in the hands of the Council of Ministers. Given the useful engagement in practical issues of clause 5, this could be accomplished by replacing “Cabinet Office” with “Council of Ministers” throughout. Given the Interpretation Act 2015 s.74(1), this would not reduce the power of the Chief Secretary to sign Emergency Regulations on behalf of the Council of Ministers.
The democratic primacy of Tynwald.
Tynwald is the paramount democratic institution of the Isle of Man, and the development of democratic accountability for the exercise of governance consists primarily of the transfer of power to Tynwald, or to bodies responsible to Tynwald, and the increased democratisation of Tynwald itself. There is a live debate over the extent to which this development is complete – demonstrated recently by debates over the voting rights of the Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man, the role of MLCs as Departmental Members, and the transfer of control of the Council of Ministers from Tynwald to the House of Keys. Nonetheless, the principal is widely accepted: serious exercise of government power requires democratic legitimacy, which at the national level is focussed in Tynwald.
I have already noted a concern that the Bill gives legislative power to a single member of the Council of Ministers, rather than to the Council of Ministers itself. The Bill, in contrast to the EPA, does not employ the concept of a state of Emergency. I discuss this more fully in the next section, but would note here that the EPA did not require Tynwald to approve a declaration of a State of Emergency. The Bill retains from the EPA a requirement that Tynwald approve the Emergency Regulation within seven days of their being made (cl.11(2)), and at 30 day intervals thereafter (cl.12 and 13). These are positive features.
The Bill does not, however, contain significant protection for Tynwald from the power of Emergency Regulations. Clause 9(5) does require the maker of such regulations to “have regard to the importance of ensuring that Tynwald and the High Court are able to conduct proceedings in connection with the Regulations”. This provision, taken from the UK Act, does not however protect Tynwald itself from the power of the EPR. It is possible for an Emergency Regulation to change the composition of Tynwald, and then secure approval for the modification by the modified Tynwald. During the 2020 Emergency, we saw an extension to a vacancy in the House of Keys, but it would have been equally possible for an EPR to redefine Tynwald or to declare particular seats vacant, or in other ways undermine the democratic basis of Tynwald, subject only to the Human Rights Act. The absence of protection for Tynwald from the reach of Emergency Regulations exercisable, as the Bill is currently drafted, by a single Minister is a flaw.
The form of such a protection could take two different forms. The first, substantive protection, would be to exclude legislation defining the composition and powers of Tynwald from the reach of Emergency Regulations. This could be done by adding further legislation to the list under clause 10(5). The difficulty with this arises if ,for instance, a disaster rendered the functioning of Tynwald under the current law impossible. A disrupted Tynwald would not be able to approve measures intended to allow it to function again. An alternative, procedural protection, would be to require the approval of Tynwald officers not involved in the creation of Emergency Regulations for any such Regulation. The President of Tynwald, already given a role under the Bill, may be an appropriate choice. Although providing less strong protection than the substantive route, this would allow greater flexibility in responding to a crisis where Tynwald is unable to function.
On a smaller point, the EPA and the current Bill would allow prosecution for an offence under an Emergency Regulation which had been rejected by Tynwald. This was queried in Tynwald in the 1920s. The solution was to prevent prosecutions for offences under EPRs which had not been approved by Tynwald. This would not remove every effect of the conduct being criminal – for instance rendering a lawful arrest unlawful – but would prevent a prosecution for an offence which had been rejected by the democratic organ of the Manx constitution.
2. Lessons from the Isle of Man.
The fundamental structure of the Bill is based on a UK model, and does not take advantage of the Manx materials available on emergency powers. In particular, the history of emergency powers legislation in the Isle of Man since the 1918 Pandemic, and the concrete experience of living under an Emergency Powers regime in 2020, are both capable of informing the shape of a future emergency powers regime.
The importance of a state of emergency.
As the Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man noted in debate in 1973, “it is quite right that emergency powers should not turn into regular powers”. The danger of emergency powers is that they seep into business in usual – that compromises acceptable because of an exceptional challenge faced by the nation become a permanent part of the legal and constitutional landscape. The great advantage of a declaration of a formal Emergency is that it marks this exceptional period apart from the normal workings of the state. Although it does not guarantee it, this helps to contain emergency powers to a period of emergency.
The importance of demarcation between an emergency and normalcy is strongly demonstrated by the Manx experience towards, and after the end of, the 2020 Emergency. The Emergency came to an end following clear signs that a growing proportion of Tynwald were concerned that EPRs were being made unnecessarily, and that the necessity for continuing emergency powers no longer existed. Part of the government response to this was to continue to make EPRs after the end of the state of Emergency, creating a dynamic period of continued executive legislative power to engage with the challenges of shifting border control – a period whose legality I have questioned. Recent Manx experience, then, shows the danger of emergency power creep and, thus, the benefits of a formal state of emergency being invoked to allow emergency powers.
The Bill does not take this approach. Instead, it takes the UK approach of allowing emergency powers to be exercised at any time. The Cabinet Office may declare that a specified event or situation is to be treated as falling within the definition of emergency (clause 3(6)), or form the view that one of the large number of events of situations specified in the Bill exists. The Cabinet Office may then proceed to make Emergency Regulations if: satisfied that an emergency has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur (clause 8(2)); the Regulation is necessary to prevent, control, or mitigate the emergency (clause 8(3)); and is needed urgently (clause 8(4)).
It would be better to retain the EPA structure of a formal declaration of a State of Emergency activating exceptional emergency powers for the duration of an Emergency. The EPA made this declaration purely a matter for the government – the Governor in Council acting on the advice of CoMin. During the 2020 Emergency, Laurie Hooper MHK argued that the declaration of Emergency required the approval of Tynwald. I do not agree with his reading of the EPA, but as a policy recommendation this approach has much to recommend it. In a small democracy such as the Isle of Man, faced with a crisis justifying emergency powers, a significant proportion of the representatives of the people should be involved in this decision. The most straightforward way to ensure this would be to allow a state of emergency to be declared by the Council of Ministers (which under the Bill could involve as few as two ministers, but would require later ratification by a majority), subject to later approval by Tynwald. Allowing an Emergency to come into effect before Tynwald met would allow rapid response to exceptional crises – for instance a radiological incident, or other environmental catastrophe. Requiring approval by Tynwald would emphasise the importance of democratic oversight.
This emphasis on democratic oversight might justify the approval not by Tynwald as a whole, but instead by the House of Keys, who are the directly elected component of the Manx constitution. This would be less of a constitutional innovation than before the change in the appointment of the Chief Minister, which saw the shift from appointment by Tynwald to appointment by the Keys. Those who argue in favour of the Legislative Council as a valuable source of scrutiny and challenge would, however, see these as being particularly important during a national Emergency. The contribution of members of the Council to scrutiny of EPRs in the 2020 Emergency was very significant.
The weaknesses of unscrutinised legislation.
The Bill retains the EPA model of executive creation of legislation with immediate effect, subject to approval by Tynwald within seven days. The 2020 Emergency provides some insights into the weaknesses of this model.
One of the notable features of the EPRs is the number of drafting errors in individual EPRs. By drafting errors I mean errors which rendered an EPR incomprehensible, or incoherent in relation to the policy it was intended to implement, rather than EPRs which were implementing a poor policy. Taking for examples only errors which were corrected by a subsequent EPR, this includes omission of a key noun in a description of facilities that could reopen, application of the fixed penalty regime to only one of the offences in a section, failing to identify the primary legislation which an EPR was modifying, excluding child minders from the scope of an EPR which specifically sought to control child minders, and omitting a schedule from an EPR which referred to that schedule for detailed provisions.
Pointing out these errors should not be taken as a criticism of an excellent drafting team who were faced with unprecedented pressure caused by the fast moving nature of the pandemic, and the need for a very high volume of legislation. The strain on limited capacity, inevitable in a small democracy, was exacerbated, however, by the post-creation scrutiny model. Early in the crisis there were complaints that the legislators were not being given sufficient time to consider EPRs before they were debated, leading the President of Tynwald to express concern to CoMin. This problem appears to have been largely addressed, although we find references to the difficulties of timely communication throughout the Emergency. Legislators frequently identified drafting errors both within and outside the legislative chamber, and in some cases voted in favour of an EPR only on the basis that an error would be speedily addressed, or upon receiving an assurance in the chamber that issues raised in debate would be dealt with by further legislation. EPRs which became law only after scrutiny by Tynwald – which given it was meeting weekly for most of the Emergency would not have excessively impeded many of the measures implemented by EPRs – would have been better drafted EPRs.
Allowing an Emergency Regulation to take effect only after approval by Tynwald could, however, restrict the ability of the government to respond effectively to a crisis. Consider, for instance, a biological attack on the Atlantic Archipeligo, or a major industrial accident causing immediate environmental damage. It may be worthwhile adopting the structure of an existing Act of Tynwald.
Early in the 2020 pandemic, the Department of Environment, Food and Agriculture created the Health Protection (Coronavirus) Regulations 2020. These were created under the Public Health Act 1990, and in particular s.51Q(3). Section 51Q lays down a general rule that a Regulation under the Public Health Protection part of the 1990 Act does not come into effect until approved by Tynwald (Public Health Act 1990 s.51Q(2)). There is an important exception however. Section 51Q(3) provides that a regulation “may come into operation without first being approved by Tynwald if it contains a declaration that the person making it is of the opinion that, by reason of urgency, it is necessary for it to come into operation before it is approved”.
Adopting the model of this 1990 Act of Tynwald would allow government to create Emergency Regulations coming into effect before approval by Tynwald, but would require a defense to Tynwald of why, “by reason of urgency”, it was necessary to do so. Many of the EPRs made in the 2020 Pandemic would not have met this test, and so would have been subject to pre-effect scrutiny by Tynwald.
If some power to create Emergency Regulations which have legal effect before Tynwald has approved them is to be retained, there is a further point to consider. The Bill states that all Emergency Regulations are to come into effect as soon as created, rather than being able to specify a date and time at which they come into effect; as was the case under the EPA (see clause 11(1)(a)). A number of EPRs made in 2020 similarly came into effect when signed. This raises a rule of law question, particularly where an EPR creates a criminal offence. If the Emergency Regulation must come into effect immediately upon creation, it may be some time before those subject to the criminal sanction become aware of its existence. The Tynwald Information Service did a remarkable job of ensuring EPRs were made available to the general public as quickly as possible, but it would usually be good practice to allow a period between an Emergency Regulation being created and it coming into effect to allow it to be made available online to the general public, and individuals affected by the Regulation to be directed to it. The Bill as currently drafted would not only not require this good practice to be implemented, but would prohibit it. Omitting Clause 11(1)(a) would allow the Emergency Regulation itself to state when it came into effect.
Finally, and on a narrow point, the seven day timescale for Tynwald to approve an Emergency Regulation – which might also be adopted for approval of a declaration of Emergency if the suggestion above was adopted – may be longer than is necessary in the context of a small, single island, democracy with well-developed transport and communications infrastructure. MHKs of the 1920s were sceptical that seven days was the proper time for an Emergency Regulation to survive without democratic endorsement. Arguing for a much tighter time-limit, J.D. Clucas MHK referred to the relative ease with which Tynwald could be convened “by means of the telephone and motor cars”. The seven day period within which Tynwald must exercise oversight of powers exercised under the Bill should be reduced.