The judgement of the EET in the Ranson case is now available. The Tribunal has awarded Dr Ranson a total of £3,198,754 damages, plus 70% of her costs at the liability stage (it should be noted that normally parties in Tribunals do not receive any costs). This breaks down into a number of different elements (summarised at para 346-347).

Injury to feelings. There was a detailed discussion as to what the maximum amount that could be awarded was, and how to apply English cases to the Manx situation. The EET took the approach that “The award should be compensatory with no element of punishing the wrongdoer. Feelings of indignation ought not to inflate the award yet neither should the award be too low because that would diminish respect for the policy …. The award must ensure that such misconduct is seen to be wrong. Additionally, the award should bear some broad general similarity to those awarded in personal injury cases” (para.130). The EET considered that “During the Liability Hearing process ( including disclosure of
documents), besides in her evidence on oath, there was also an attempt by Miss Magson to cover-up her misconduct. This was bound to inflame justified injured feelings” (para. 132).. She was awarded £40,000 for injury to feelings,

Aggravated damages. These are damages which may be awarded “when the Respondent has acted in a high-handed, malicious, insulting or oppressive manner” (para.137). The Tribunal considered this to be beyond argument, and no contrary view as put forward by the DHSC. The Tribunal explicitly found that that the wrong was committed in a “demeaning and spiteful way”, motivated by “animosity and spiteful misconduct”, with subsequent misconduct in the way the DHSC opposed Dr Ranson’s action (para.140) She was awarded £20,000 of aggravated damages.

Personal injury. These are damages to reflect personal injury suffered because of the wrong committed by the other party. The Tribunal noted that there were no known Manx High Court authorities on personal injury awards following whistleblowing, and drew on the English approach. The Tribunal did not completely accept Dr Ranson’s case as to the personal injury suffered, and was not happy with the level of disclosure by Dr Ranson as to her previous medical history, “particularly after her many complaints about non-disclosure by the DHSC relating to the Liability Hearing” (para.161). It was, however, much more critical of the medical expert called by the DHSC (para.174). The two parties had proposed either £56,000 or £30,000 damages. She was awarded £40,000 of damages for personal injury.

Medical expenses. These are expenses reasonably necessary to ensure the best chance of recovery. The Tribunal accepted most of the treatments Dr Ranson’s medical expert suggested, and awarded her £6000 for medical expenses.

Exemplary damagaes. These can be awarded where conduct is “oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional” (para.176), and are awarded not to compensate the complainant, but to show that the governmental misconduct had to be punished. It was agreed that the DHSC was a public body against which such damages could be made. The Tribunal found that the rulings in the Liability Decision “amply justified Miss Magson’s misconduct (and to a lesser extent that of others) as being oppressive and arbitrary” (para.181), justified on the basis of unreasonable conduct and false evidence (para.187). The two parties had proposed either £100,000 or around £4,000. She was awarded £10,000 for exemplary damages. The Tribunal saw “The very fact of making the award at all demonstrates that the Tribunal considered punishment was warranted for the oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional behaviour – amounting to gross misconduct” (para.185). This was to be punished through the award of costs (discussed below), and adding a substantial exemplary damages head “plus a very large costs burden which is also awarded (this being, in effect, a punishment) would impact not just the DHSC but, in reality, Manx taxpayers and, in all probability, persons on hospital waiting-lists.” (para. 186).

Compensatory award. This is the amount awarded to compensate for financial losses caused by the wrong – in particular, loss of salary. As the Tribunal notes “this is not an exact science. Fortunately, there is abundant legal precedent about how to approach something which is, inevitably, unpredictable.” (para 213). I will gloss over the abundant legal principles and approach. The analysis of Dr Ranson’s future career prospects is also – in contrast to the other heads – very personal (as illustrated by the list of questions about Dr Ranson the Tribunal felt it needed to address, para.323). The Tribunal awarded £185,670.64 for past loss (i.e. loss before the date of the judgment), and £1,464,118.08 for future loss of earnings (a higher number is given earlier in the judgment, and then reduced by 25% to reflect “non-exhaustive uncertainties” (para. 334). Additionally, future pension loss was calculated at £749, 718.15, plus £8062.60 for the Manx state pension.

.Interest on some elements of these awards totalled a further £ 8,994.95 (para. 345).

It is striking to find aggravated and, especially, exemplary damages, awarded against the DHSC in this case. The concerns over the way in which the defence of the action was conducted are returned to in the, exceptional, award of costs for the Liability Decision. The Tribunal notes that “In effect, when an order for costs is made, it is because of gross misconduct” (p348). The Tribunal considered that the proceedings were conducted unreasonably, and “involved a false allegation (and indeed, more than one)” (para. 351). This is discussed at length from para. 352-

In particular, at para 363-4 the Tribunal said: “It is however inexcusable for a Chief Executive such as Miss Magson to mislead both the Tribunal and Dr Ranson. The case on liability was fought tooth and nail by the DHSC on a false basis to the substantial detriment of Dr Ranson and at the expense of taxpayers on the Isle of Man … Miss Magson knew that the denials of liability in the Response contained assertions and allegations that were untrue. She knew or should have known and understood that the way she had drafted the Response was unsustainable. She knew or should have known that her pleaded arguments could never survive scrutiny once the documents which needed to be revealed were in fact disclosed”.

The Tribunal did not award full costs to Dr Ranson for the Liability Decision, on the basis that “Even if the DHSC case had contained bona fide but ultimately unsuccessful cornerstones, Dr Ranson would have had to incur quite considerable costs which, as a norm, would not be recoverable at all.” (para. 366) – reducing recovery to 70% of the legal costs once assessed or agreed.

It did not, however, make the same order in relation to the costs of the Disclosure Proceedings. As part of explaining this decision making, the Tribunal discuss the EXPOL report seeking to resolve whether there were concocted documents. To quote at length:

From almost as soon the EXPOL report became available, the Tribunal was informed
that Dr Ranson did not agree with the conclusions. Thereafter, it was apparent from
her evidence in this Tribunal in January 2023 that she did not agree with the outcome,
at least to some extent. Inter alia, she did not consider EXPOL to be independent.
However, her witness statement never set out any reasoned attack on the
conclusions. It did not point out why she stood by her allegations that all or some of
the documents were concocted. She gave no evidence to expand on her rejection of
any of the conclusions.

371. Because of the influence on potential issues of Exemplary Damages and costs, the
     Tribunal had anticipated that, because the conclusions of the EXPOL report were
     controversial or disputed, there would have been a request on Dr Ranson’s behalf for
     a Witness Order (or Orders) for cross-examination of EXPOL officers at the Remedy
     Hearing. That did not happen.
372. The appeal process last year regarding documentation issues was heard by the learned
     First Deemster. He rejected the appeal but in his judgment, he had cautioned against
     the Tribunal taking on too much of an investigatory role. It was therefore not
     considered to be the role of the Tribunal of its own initiative to require attendance of
     the personnel behind the EXPOL Report, even though the Tribunal had expected this
     to happen.
373. In the event, Dr Ranson’s team did not seek to call anybody involved with preparation
     of the EXPOL report. However, in his Closing Submissions, Mr Segal alleged quite
     detailed and serious shortcomings about the conclusions of no improper concoction.
     Mr Segal still maintained that some of the documents were concocted – to the extent
     that he encouraged this Tribunal to refer the allegations of concocted documents to
     the Isle of Man Constabulary for further investigation.
374. While the Tribunal had hoped and expected to have the issue of the alleged
     concoctions tested and resolved, this was not possible. Without questioning the
     appropriate witnesses, as Mr Segal had the chance to do by seeking witness orders
     against the authors of the EXPOL report, it would be quite wrong for this Tribunal to
     come to any conclusions one way or the other – let alone to refer the matter to the
     Isle of Man Constabulary. There remains nothing to stop Dr Ranson referring the
     matter to the Constabulary herself.

The award of the Tribunal in relation to exemplary damages, and costs, although a relatively small part of the overall award, are sobering. The DHSC has been found by the Tribunal to have acted in a high-handed, malicious, insulting or oppressive manner; in a way which was “oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional”; and in a way which involved gross misconduct.

In 1920, Tynwald did not take the opportunity to open jury service up to Manx women, although contemporary English legislation did so at the same time as addressing women’s suffrage. This was a deliberate decision by Tynwald, revisited repeatedly until, at the very late date of 1980, women were able to sit in juries in Manx courts. 

In 1920 the Sex Disqualification Removal Bill was debated in Tynwald. Based on 1919 UK legislation, the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919, one clause would have allowed women to serve on Manx juries. The Bill began in the Legislative Council, as was common for significant Bills of the time, and was passed with little discussion. The Bill then moved to the House of Keys, where questions were raised as to whether there was any demand for Manx women to sit on juries, whether women defendants were treated unfairly by all male juries,  and whether the English law reform had been a success. An amendment removing juries from the ambit of the Bill was passed without a vote, and accepted by the Legislative Council.

In 1949 a Bill to allow women to serve on Manx juries, based again on the 1919 UK legislation, failed in the Legislative Council; and a motion in Tynwald in 1959 to add women to the roster for jury service failed to secure a majority in either the Keys or the Council.

It remained a live issue however, driven by the Women’s Institute from 1963, and a Bill whose sole purpose was to include women was introduced to the Keys by the government in 1965. The proposer of the Bill, however, stressed that the Women’s Institute focussed on legal change to permit women to serve, while the Bill introduced “is rather different, for it brings women onto equal terms to men and it makes jury service compellable”.  Two different amendments were proposed which would allow women to choose whether to be compellable for jury service – one an “opt-in”, the other an “opt-out”. The “opt-in” commanded more Keys support, and in an amended form that reflected this, passed the Keys by a margin of 20 votes to 1. It was described in the Isle of Man Examiner as giving “women … the best of both worlds … this gracious compromise”. 

The Bill, which now had compellable jury service for men and voluntary jury service for women, proceeded to the Legislative Council. The Attorney General expressed the view that the principle of voluntary service was entirely wrong, and had been reinforced on this by consultations with the UK Home Office. Other voices rejected the voluntary jury service for women only approach, and the Bill failed without a division. 

The issue was returned to in 1978, led by Mrs Hanson MHK. She was one of two women MHKs at the time, and a significant fault line developed between her approach, and that of the other woman MHK, Mrs Quayle. Mrs Hanson argued for women to be subject to compellable jury service obligations on the same basis as men; Mrs Quayle returned to the earlier theme of Manx debates, and indeed debates elsewhere in the common law world, and supported an opt-in for women who were willing to serve as jurors. The majority of the Keys followed the approach of Mrs Hanson, albeit with “a mother’s clause”.

The Jury Act 1980 as originally passed provided that “every person” registered as entitled to vote, between the ages of 18 and 65, and having been ordinarily resident in the British Islands for any period of five years since attaining the age of 13 was qualified to serve on all Manx juries as a civic duty. This was later amended to extend the maximum age to 75, and to start the period of normal residence from 18. The Deemster could excuse a prospective juror as they saw fit, but a specific clause treated some women differently from other prospective jurors. Section 12(4) provided that “an application by a woman that she is the mother of a child under sixteen years of age and has the care of that child shall be good and sufficient reason for that woman to be excused”. Authority to excuse a prospective juror was later transferred to the Chief Registrar, who may excuse a prospective juror for any good reason, and “personally undertaking the full-time care of a child under the age of 16”, or a person with a disability, or being themselves 71 years or older, shall be “a good and sufficient reason” (Jury Act 1980 s.12 as amended). The modern version of the section, unlike the one originally passed, is not limited to mothers, and is open to both men and women.The first woman to be called to a Manx jury was Mrs Ann Dugdale, “Grandmother of nine” (Isle of Man Examiner, 4/9/1981 at p1). She was called to join an otherwise male inquest jury, called by the Coroner, Henry Callow, in relation to a fatal road traffic accident involving a holidaymaker. Described by the press as a “cheerful grandmother”, she was joined, before the jury sat, by two other women jurors (Joceline Kelly and Ruth Kelly). The Coroner expressed pleasure at seeing women jurors, and seeing women take a full place in their civic duties. Mrs Dugdale recognised it was a historic moment, and took the view that “I’m all in favour of women in juries, and it’s not before time. We’re far more intelligent than men anyway”.

[This is a cross-post from the Women in Manx Politics blog]

1919 was a hugely important year for the internal Manx constitution – that is, the rules which define and allocate legal power within the Isle of Man, as opposed to between the Isle of Man and non-Manx bodies. This blog explores one facet of 1919, changes to the membership of Tynwald. In particular, two changes to the Manx constitution in 1919 seem in tension with each other – the opening up of membership in the House of Keys to women by the House of Keys Election Act 1919 s.15; and the creation of indirectly elected and appointed members of the Legislative Council, such new members being limited to men, under the Isle of Man Constitution Amendment Act 1919 s.12.

Although these provisions were passed in the same year, they have a very different background.

The Constitution Act can be traced to a 1907 petition of the House of Keys seeking a range of constitutional reforms, which led to an important report by the UK Government. In 1913, the Lieutenant-Governor informed the Keys that he intended to introduce a Constitution Bill into the Keys in the first instance (HK 2 December 1913). The Bill introduced at the Lieutenant-Governor’s request was a comprehensive document addressing a range of reforms proposed by the government report. The introducing MHK, Mr Crennell, noted that a better way to proceed would be to divide it into separate Bills, and Part I of the original Bill, which dealt with the composition of the Council, was read for the first time in January 1914 (HK 6 January 1914). He was given leave to introduce the other parts as separate Bills (HK 20 January 1914).

The discussion of this truncated Bill in the Keys was protracted (HK 20 January 1914; HK 17 February 1914; HK 3 March 1914), but focussed on two issues: which ex offio members of the Legislative Council to lose, and whether the “elected” members should be elected by the Keys, or by direct election. Of interest is the proposal that the Keys should elect MLCs, but that they should elect two persons representing farming, and two the towns and villages – reminiscent of later developments in the Irish Free State (HK 17 February 1914); or that MHKs for different sheadings should be the electors for an MLC representing their sheading – reminiscent of later developments in Pakistan. There was limited discussion of what became section 12, but entirely focussed on whether clergy should (as with elections to the Keys) be excluded (HK 25 February 1914). The limit of the clause to “male” was not a topic for discussion at all.

The 1914 Bill was passed by the Keys, and then proceeded to the Legislative Council where it failed on second reading (LC 17 April 1914). The Attorney General moved for rejection of the Bill, on the basis that an entire constitutional reform scheme had been put forward, and that the entire scheme needed to be considered in order to create “a new system of a fairly balanced character”. The Keys protested at this rejection (HK 21 April 1914, LC 15 May 1914), and later in the year the UK government intervened, advising the Lieutenant-Governor to proceed with seven Bills introduced separately (HK 26 May 1914). All seven Bills were read for the first time in Legislative Council in the summer of 1914 (LC 12 June 1914), but the commencement of the Great War lead to the Bills not being proceeded with (LC 25 May 1915).

The Constitution Bills were returned to in 1919, with the Keys petitioning the UK Prime Minister in relation to the reforms flowing from the 1907 petition (HK 7 January 1919).  The Constitution Bill dealing with the composition of Legislative Council was introduced into the Legislative Council in April 1919 (LC 29 April 1919). As Deemster Moore noted, this was a Bill which had first come before the Legislative Council in June 1914, when he had been one of only two members of the Council to support it. There was brief discussion of gender in relation to what became s.12 in the Legislative Council. The Vicar General queried whether the limitation of MLCs to males had been before the Keys, and thought that they had changed their view on the topic. The Vicar General, speaking I think on behalf of the Archdeacon who had “strong views about women being elected to positions of this kind”, suggested that the word “male” (and so the exclusion of women MLCs) “ought to go out”, but later concluded that “it would be desirable to leave it to themselves [the Keys] to alter their own views”. The Attorney General was content with the limit: “We might advance slowly – festina lente. In England the elective principle came before the universal suffrage”. The Bill was passed by Legislative Council with the “male” limit intact.

In the Keys, it is clear that the 1919 Bill was simply seen as a continuation of the 1914 Bill (HK 3 June 1919). The introducing MHK, Mr Quine, noted (slightly inaccurately) that it was identical to the Bill passed by the Keys – and rejected by the Council – in 1914. The only significant difference was a provision excluding clergymen from the Council, which the Legislative Council had removed. What became section 12 passed with very little discussion, and none on gender. The Bill passed in the Keys in June 1919, and received Royal Assent.

So the Act which ended up excluding women from the new seats in the Legislative Council was, fundamentally, a Bill which the Keys discussed at length in January-March 1914. The substantive decisions were taken in early 1914, and not revisited in 1919. The possibility of women MLCs was not raised in 1914 and – apart from a query raised but not pursued by ecclesiastical members of the Council – not discussed in 1919.

Generally, the House of Keys Act can also be traced back to before the Great War, and the efforts of Mr Crennell to introduce adult suffrage into the elections of the Keys (HK 19 November 1912, HK 18 February 1913, HK November 1916). The Bill was passed by the House of Keys  in 1918 (HK 30 April 1918), but when it passed to the Legislative Council they voted to postpone consideration of the Bill because of new legislation in England. This decision was made in November 1918 (LC 5 November 1918), and this must be a reference to the Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act 1918, which received Royal Assent on 21 November 1918. Section 1 of this UK Act provided “A woman shall not be disqualified by sex or marriage for being elected to or sitting or voting as a Member of the Commons House of Parliament”. After a nudge from the Keys (HK 28 January 1919), the Legislative Council returned to the Bill in February 1919.

In discussing the Bill, the Attorney General raised the issue of whether the Legislative Council should follow the House of Keys, or “follow the lead of England and make women eligible for membership of the other House” (LC 18 February 1919). A new clause was agreed in Council that provided “A woman shall not be disqualified by sex or marriage for being elected to or sitting or voting as a member of the House of Keys”. The closeness to the 1918 Act of Parliament shows which way the Legislative Council answered the Attorney-General’s question. The Council also proposed changes to the qualification requirements of women voters, again drawing more strongly on English models than the Keys version.

The Key’s consideration of the proposed amendments principally  focussed on the rights of women voters, but there was some discussion of the new clause giving women the right to stand for the Keys (HK 11 March 1919). Mr Teare felt the new clause should be rejected: “The Council, in a further amendment, have provided that women shall be eligible to sit in the House of Keys at 21 years of age; they are to have the privilege of legislating, but not of voting, or that of owning their own goods, if they are married … She can contract debts, but she is not legally liable to pay them. It seems remarkable that ladies are to have the privilege of sitting in the House, and yet not have the right to pay election expenses. or to engage in contracts which are necessary to secure election. The reasons why this amendment has been introduced are not strong or conclusive, and the mere adaptation of the English measure is quite contrary to the spirit of the Adult Suffrage Bill introduced by my predecessor.” Mr Southward objected to women as young as 18 being elected, but stressed: “Not that I object to ladies sitting in the House of Keys; they may possible add a charm to our meeting which hitherto it has not possessed, and they might possibly reduce the long speeches which we sometimes have to listen to”. Others felt this was an issue for the electorate. Mr J Qualtrough noted, in this context, “They will not only be an addition but an extra quality to the composition of the House in the coming time, and I hope when we get Council reform it will be possible for a lady to sit even there”. This is the only comment in 1913-1919 about the difference.

Clause 15 as sent down by the Legislative Council was passed by the Keys. The Bill was made subject of a conference with the Legislative Council, which resulted in the Council “withdrawing their amendments on the subject of the qualification of women” – women MHKs, having already been accepted by the Keys, was not a topic (LC 8 April 1919).

To summarise this legislative history. The 1919 exclusion of women MLCs was debated in 1914, and not revisited in 1919. The 1919 inclusion of women as MHKs was introduced very late in the legislative process, by the Legislative Council rather than the Keys, influenced strongly by the UKs passing of the  Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act 1918. The two measures are thus separated by the Great War, and the changes brought about by that collective experience.

This legislative history is singularly short of discussion of principles that might underpin the right of women to sit as members of Tynwald, and which might therefore be used to justify the distinction between women MHKs and women MLCs. My sense from the debates is that the position of women in Tynwald was, if considered at all, seen as peripheral to the constitutional reforms in both measures. The Constitution Act was primarily about introducing some sort of democratic element into the previously purely ex officio Legislative Council, the House of Keys Act was primarily about changing voting qualifications to introduce universal suffrage. The change to the Keys, introduced at the last minute in the legislative process, was driven by the Legislative Council’s favouring of a recent UK model; and accepted by the Keys with limited opposition but little enthusiasm. No such model existed for MLCs, and the principles of the Constitution Act were in any case not reopened in 1919.

The above may be read as an argument that the difference between women MHKs and women MLCs was almost an accident. Given the same legislators were considering both sets of legislation in 1919, and that the difference survived until 1961, this would be too simplistic. I think two principles, beyond the pragmatism I suggest in the previous paragraph, may underpin the willingness of the  Tynwald of 1919 to accept this difference.

Firstly, the 1919 reforms to the Council were the result of decades of constitutional pressure, and while seen as a hugely significant constitutional reform, were not seen as an end point by reform minded MHKs. Securing elected membership on the Council may have been seen as a sufficient first step, with the possibility of opening the Legislative Council up to women as a separate task. As the Attorney General said, “We might advance slowly”. Against this, the origin of the right of women to sit in the Keys originating in the Council may suggest that the Keys of 1919 were not committed to women’s right to join Tynwald.

Secondly, the reformed Legislative Council was in many ways seen as closer to the UK House of Lords than was the case in later decades. As I have discussed elsewhere, for decades there was an assumption that the right person to be appointed by the Keys to the Council was an MHK or former MHK. Given the overwhelmingly male makeup of the Keys, and the impossibility of any woman MHK having a long period of service starting before 1919, a woman “elder statesman” may have struck members of Tynwald in 1919 as a contradiction in terms. I do not want to put too much weight on a single word from a single MHK, but it will be recalled that the only MHK to see a link between women MHKs and women MLCs, Mr John Qualtrough said “I hope when we get Council reform it will be possible for a lady to sit even there”. He was speaking in March 1919, and the Council reform Bill was discussed in June 1919. Mr Qualtrough may have been anticipating a six month delay, rather than more than 40 years. But “even” is interesting to me, and may suggest that barriers to women MLCs might be seen as greater than for women MHKs.

These, and assumptions about the place of women in public life we see much more clearly discussed in relation to the place of women in Manx juries, may have underpinned the outcome of 1919. Having gone through the debates, however, my view is that the different times of the two provisions formulation – 1913 and 1919 – were at least as important.

A guest blog by Advocate Paul Beckett M.A., M.St. (Oxon.), Visiting Research Fellow, School of Law, Oxford Brookes University.

On 1 December 2022 the Isle of Man Government opened a public consultation on “assisted dying”, discreetly avoiding any reference to assisted suicide.One of the most divisive issues of our times, assisted suicide is defended and opposed with equal vehemence, and moral, ethical and legal arguments all fuel the debate over the right to ‘self-determination’. Euthanasia and assisted suicide, killed by medical professionals or killed by one’s own hand, lead to very much the same result: death.

Many countries have legalised euthanasia or assisted suicide.What sets the present Isle of Man consultation apart is not its thoughtful balancing of the emotional and clinical issues on which it seeks public comment, but something which is not stated, because it is self evident. This debate concerns euthanasia in a low tax jurisdiction.

Where there is death, there is a phalanx of tax planners eager to advise. For both onshore and offshore tax residents, there are heavyweight fiscal arguments to consider.Putting the ethical issues to one side, is there are danger that euthanasia could be hijacked – repurposed to serve the needs of death tax planning?

Leaving a low tax area, intending to be euthanised.

Picture a scene in which someone has relocated from their home country, in this case the United Kingdom, which is their domicile of origin, to the Isle of Man, their new domicile of choice. They are tax resident in the Isle of Man. Then imagine that because euthanasia is not yet available in the Isle of Man, this person will travel to Switzerland in order to end their life.

By leaving the Isle of Man for Switzerland with the sole intention of carrying out an assisted suicide, the Isle of Man – to which they are clearly not returning – is no longer their domicile of choice. For Switzerland to become their new domicile of choice, they would need to meet Swiss tax residence requirements. An individual is deemed to be a tax-resident under Swiss domestic tax law, if:

• the individual has the intention to permanently establish his/her usual abode in Switzerland, which is usually where the individual has his/her centre of vital interest, and is registered with the municipal authorities, or if
• the individual stays in Switzerland with the intention to exercise gainful activities for a consecutive period (ignoring short absences) of at least 30 days, or if
• the individual stays in Switzerland with no intention to exercise gainful activities for a consecutive period (ignoring short absences) of at least 90 days.

But they are merely visiting in order to die, and none of these criteria is met. In this limbo, their default domicile for taxation purposes becomes once again their domicile of origin; the United Kingdom. The impact on a lifetime’s careful savings could be considerable, not to mention the consequences for family left behind.

---

Moving to a low tax area, intending to be euthanised.

Now assume that euthanasia has become legal in the Isle of Man. The Isle of Man Government consultation explains the aim of the proposed legislation to be:

• to enable mentally competent adults who are terminally ill to be provided with assistance to end their life at their request.
• A person is deemed to be terminally ill if a registered medical practitioner has diagnosed them as having a progressive disease, which can reasonably be expected to cause their death.
• The person must be 18 years of age or over and is a permanent resident on the Isle of Man.

“A permanent resident on the Isle of Man” – would this not, as in Switzerland, be an impediment to someone wishing to be euthanised who attempts to abandon their domicile of origin in the United Kingdom or (having earlier abandoned their United Kingdom domicile of origin) their domicile of choice elsewhere, by relocating to the Isle of Man? Would they also be in limbo, unable to establish that the Isle of Man had become their “permanent residence” and hence their domicile of choice in which they were tax resident. Would they remain domiciled in (or would their domicile revert to) the United Kingdom?

Not necessarily. There is no definition of residence for tax purposes in the Isle of Man.[1] The Isle of Man treats those individuals having a view or intent of establishing residence as tax resident from the date of their arrival. The Assessor of Income Tax will look at evidence showing that the presence in the Isle of Man is not for a temporary purpose.

Intending to live in the Isle of Man for the rest of one’s life is hardly a temporary purpose. And in any case, one’s appointment with death may be booked after residence has commenced. There is no compulsion to reveal advice received or their innermost thoughts and intentions. The Assessor of Income Tax can hardly ask a new resident how long they plan to remain among the living.

Death tax planning – euthanasia repurposed.

The result? In the hands of international wealth and tax planners, euthanasia will have been repurposed. The Isle of Man, as a low tax jurisdiction with ill-defined tax residency rules, may become the destination of choice for a steady stream of tax-advised, terminally ill individuals. The Isle of Man is gentle and welcoming, and there are far worse places in which to spend one’s final days. But what will be the social impact on the island and on the island’s reputation abroad of what amounts to death tourism?

A very brief blog here. Today Deemster Corlett gave judgment in the issue which remained to be resolved from his quick rejection of the earlier DHSC appeal against the conduct of the Ranson tribunal in relation to professional privilege. Had the Tribunal exceeded its powers in calling for evidence from a solicitor working in the Attorney General’s Chambers?

There was no discussion of whether the Tribunal could order a violation of legal professional privilege, both parties agreeing it could not (para.5). Instead, the decision turned on the duties which the solicitor was under in respect of their own conduct.

As Mr Halsall, arguing for Dr Ranson, put it: “The EET was however entitled to receive evidence as to how the Department’s solicitor had, as a matter of fact, discharged her onerous duties to ensure that disclosure was properly achieved. This would not involve disclosing legal advice but would relate to how, as a matter of fact, she had discharged her personal, professional obligations. Ms Heeley had in fact already provided a statement to the EET on 14 September 2022. This had dealt with factual issues and had clearly assisted the EET but without breaching LPP” (summarised, para.23).

.In relation to these onerous duties, Deemster Corlett noted: “It is clear from the authorities that a failure by a solicitor or an advocate to discharge his or her duties in relation to disclosure can lead not only to adverse inferences being drawn against the client, but also to wasted costs orders against the lawyer and/or a contempt finding. The extent to which our system of civil justice depends on the integrity of advocates in this respect (for example in ensuring disclosure of relevant documents which are unfavourable to the client) cannot be overemphasized”. (para.27)

Deemster Corlett interpreted the actions of the EET as compatible with determining these facts without violating legal professional privilege (para.32(1)). While it was unusual to seek evidence from a legal professional for one party: “They were entitled to come to the view that, the key witness Miss Magson being out of the jurisdiction and seemingly reluctant to provide information voluntarily, their best hope of getting near to the truth about disclosure was to require Ms Heeley to provide information about how she personally had approached disclosure. The EET were entitled to conclude that other avenues were closed to them. They knew that they should not bring about a breach of LPP and did not at any time intend to do so” (para.32(2)).

On the 16th of September 2022 Charles III was proclaimed in Tynwald in a special sitting. Hansard is not yet available – and given the ceremonial nature of the sitting may not be a priority as Tynwald debates wrestle with crucial issues – but the order of proceedings, interestingly titled “Proclamation of the Lord of Mann at St.John’s”, is available on-line here.

The Office of the Clerk of Tynwald has usefully summarised the proclamations of previous new monarchs from 1765-1952, available on-line here. Comparing the current proclamation with that of Elizabeth II shows some interesting differences. Apart from the obvious His/Her and Queen/King changes and name changes, I have marked the formal proclamation of Charles III in bold where text has been added or replaced, and in italics where it has been deleted.

WHEREAS it hath pleased Almighty God to call to His mercy our late Sovereign Lady Queen
Elizabeth II, of blessed and glorious memory, by whose decease the Crown of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is solely and rightfully come to the High and Mighty Prince Charles Philip Arthur
George: We, therefore, the Lieutenant Governor, the Deemsters, and the Council and Keys, in the
presence of other office holders, do now hereby with one voice and consent of tongue and heart
publish and proclaim that the High and Mighty Prince Charles Philip Arthur George is now, by the death of our
late Sovereign, of happy memory, become our only lawful and rightful liege Lord Charles III, by
the grace of God Queen of this Realm of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of his other
realms and territories King, Lord of Mann, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith, to
whom we do acknowledge all faith and constant obedience with hearty and humble affection beseeching God, by whom Kings and Queens do reign to bless His Majesty with long and happy years to reign over us. God save the King, Lord of Mann.

A few minor points first. There is a distinct change of tone in the proclamation of Charles III. As the deleted text shows, there is less emphasis on his being High and Mighty. At the same time, the latest Proclamation focuses on the institutional acceptance of the rights of Charles III by focussing on Tynwald “in the presence of other office holders”, while that of Elizabeth II focussed on Tynwald “being here assisted with other officers and the principal inhabitants of the Isle of Man”. The reference to the principal inhabitants of the Island may, however, have been more than replaced by a new element, added after the final proclamation:

Gheiney as vraane seyrey Vannin, ayns y
chenn whaiyl eu er nyn jaglym cooidjagh,
ta mee geamagh erriu, myr cowrey yn
leighaltys eu, dy hassoo as three eamynmoyllee y chur son E Ard-Ooashley Smoo
Graysoil y Ree, Chiarn Vannin.

Free men and women of Mann, in your
ancient parliament assembled, I call on you,
as an expression of your loyalty, to stand
and give three cheers for His Most Gracious
Majesty the King, Lord of Mann.

To me the most interesting element is the shift from an emphasis on a unitary reference to “the Crown” to be found in the Proclamation of Elizabeth II, as “Queen of this Realm and of all her other realms and territories”. Instead, in a sharp departure, we find Charles III being proclaimed with equal emphasis as King of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the suzerain of the feudatory monarch, the Lord of Mann), and Lord of Mann. The Proclamation of Elizabeth II does not refer, even in passing, to her being Lord of Mann. The term is similarly absent from the earlier Proclamations dating back to 1765 – the older are less well documented by the Clerk’s Office, but there is nothing to suggest that the Lord of Mann was emphasised in this period, and then removed at the same time as proper transcriptions were easily available.

The obvious question is why the constitutional innovation of a dual Proclamation? I have discussed the relationship between Sovereign and Lord at some length in this open-access article. An important change that happened between the two most recent Proclamations is decisions of Manx courts, and legislative practice, giving a new legal significance to the Lordship in relation to the relative authorities of Tynwald and Parliament. Similarly, the degree of autonomy possessed by the Isle of Man increased very significantly during the reign of Elizabeth II. In the context of a constitutional monarchy, a public discourse which emphasises the existence, and authority of the constitutional monarch as Lord of Mann is one which emphasises Manx autonomy. So the dual Proclamation can, I think, be seen as a constitutional innovation that recognises, and in a minor way reinforces, the increased autonomy of the Isle of Man.

I will conclude with a final nerdy point on numbering. Arguably Elizabeth I was briefly Lord of Mann at the end of her reign; meaning that Elizabeth II was an accurate description whether we focus on Lord or Queen. Neither Charles I nor Charles II were Lord of Mann during their reigns. So should Charles be referred to as Charles II (recognising the Lordship of Charles Stanley) when being referred to as Lord of Man, and Charles III when being referred to as King of the United Kingdom? In other words, is the dual Proclamation sufficiently dual? There is a precedent, albeit in relation to the Union of England and Scotland. In 1953 McCormick v Lord Advocate 1953 SLT 255 (summarised here) involved a challenge to the use of Elizabeth II as the regnal number in Scotland, as there had never been an earlier Elizabeth reigning in Scotland. The Inner House found that choice as to numbering was a part of the royal prerogative. Charles could choose his regnal number as freely as his name – if he had wished to be Charles X that would have been, literally, his prerogative. Winston Churchill pragmatically suggested that the tension between Scottish and English numbering was likely to be resolved by British sovereigns using whichever was the highest number. This appears to have been adopted for resolving the Lord and Sovereign numbering problem.

Two important decisions concerning the ongoing hearings of the Ranson Tribunal became available on the Manx courts judgment database this week – the judgment of Deemster Corlett on an appeal on points concerning the management of the case (delivered last week), and a direction with explanation issued this week by the Tribunal itself following hearings earlier in the week. The latter contains some very detailed discussion of sources of evidence provided to the EET, and cooperation or otherwise of potential witnesses, which I will not discuss in this blog (but are discussed in some detail in the EET direction para. 19-44).

Deemster Corlett usefully begins his judgment with a summary of developments since the decision by the EET of the 9^th of May. As part of the decision of the 9^th of May, the EET ordered that there would be a Disclosure Hearing, and that the parties were required to work together to agree the format for this hearing. On 22 June Dr Ranson applied for twenty-five persons to swear affadavits for the three day hearing due to commence on 30 August 2022. On 12 July the DHSC submitted a response to this application, and on 29 July there was a hearing by the EET, leading to two orders by the EET.

The business before the Deemster was an appeal from aspects of the decisions of the EET arising from this hearing.

Privilege.

One issue was whether Ms Heeley, a lawyer in the Attorney General’s Chambers, should be obliged to provide evidence to the Tribunal; or whether requiring her to do so violated privilege – that is, the zone for confidential discussion between a client and an advocate. Deemster Corlett did not decide this issue at the end of August, but instead adjourned it to another day. Given the length and complexity of privilege cases before the Manx courts such as Bitel LLC v Kyrgyz Mobil, one can see why.

The EET briefly reflected on this later, arguing that while it had required Ms Heeley to “provide details of the entire approach she adopted to ensure proper disclosure and highlighting and explaining where and how matters had gone wrong”, this was not seen as a breach of legal privilege by the parties in the hearing, and that there was not a conflict between this requirement and duties concerning advocate-client privilege (para.33-36). The EET also noted the possibility that the Attorney General’s Chambers might cooperate with the EET in providing information relevant to understanding the nature of any disclosure failings (para.37).

The power of the EET.

The second issue, which was resolved, was whether the EET had the power to convene a Disclosure Hearing at all. This was a new argument by the DHSC, which had previously been complying with the process (see para. 30-35). So Deemster Corlett had to consider whether, procedurally, it was too late to raise this issue – was this an exceptional case in which the Deemster should allow the new point on jurisdiction to be raised on appeal? Deemster Corlett reviewed the case law, including a Manx decision from last year (para. 42-52), and concluded after “a difficult balancing exercise” that the new point should not be allowed (para.52).

Deemster Corlett could have stopped there, but he moved on to consider the merits of the point the DHSC wished to raise; in case he had struck the balance in the wrong place. He was critical of the way in which the EET had expressed itself on the 9^th of May, in particular comments of the EET around miscarriages of justice and the danger of disclosure failings in the High Court, and the description of the disclosure hearing as “special” (para.54); and language used on the 1 August (para.60). In the actual conduct of the case since the 9^th of May, however, Deemster Corlett emphasised the EET’s focus on matters pertaining to the case before it – excluding, for instance, some causes of action between the parties (para.55-6) – as ensuring that “the issue of disclosure is tied to the issue of damages and costs” (para. 54). As part of this, the EET, in responding to the initial requests of Dr Ranson, had focussed on “system failures within the Department”, rather than across government (para.66).

Deemster Corlett found that the EET had, as the form and content of the Disclosure Hearing developed, focussed on matters of direct and pressing importance for the case before them (for his review of relevant authorities, see para.38-41). In particular, he found that the EET did not have “a free-standing jurisdiction to hold a disclosure hearing” (para.30), but was entitled to resolve issues relevant to the allocation of costs between the parties (para.31), and the remedy to be given to Dr Ranson: in particular whether aggravated damages should be awarded (para.33). The orders made by the EET after the July hearing was “far more constrained that that which Dr Ranson was seeking” (para.35).

As a result, Deemster Corlett concluded:

“In summary I consider that there is no sustainable foundation for Mr Callin’s submission that the Employment and Equality Tribunal are engaged on a “frolic of their own” as he put it, which is a phrase familiar to lawyers, akin to a public enquiry. The disclosure hearing in my judgment is plainly to be limited to the relevant remaining issues, namely compensation, particularly the issue of aggravated damages, and costs. Any sensible interpretation of the Tribunal’s order and its judgment of 1 August 2022 supports this interpretation.” (para.73).

Following the decision of the High Court, the EET was able to proceed with the disclosure hearing. It had originally been planned to publish “a definitive decision on deficiencies in the disclosure process” (para.3), but this was no longer practical. One reason was the decision of the DHSC to seek representation from outside the Attorney General’s Chambers, to avoid a possible conflict of interests (para.8, 31-37), but there were also issues with possible witnesses not having contributed, and a technical report not being available. As a result, the EET will continue the process in November.

The EET explicit state the reason for an investigation of “how and why there had been a serious risk of a miscarriage of justice” as being “essential” (para.17) to resolve claims for aggravated damages, and for exemplary damages, and the possibility of costs being awarded to Dr Ranson (para.13).

Damages.

A key, and legitimate, function of the disclosure hearing, then, concerns damages. Deemster Corlett noted that there had been some suggestion in oral argument that aggravated damages could not be awarded by an EET, but the point had not been argued, and “I do not think it is a very good point anyway because having read the Sutton v Creechurch [2019 MLR 172] authority it seems that that is certainly just not right” (para.28).

Sutton v Creechurch is a long running case, but the key judgment can be found here. It is particularly interesting for the Ranson proceedings because it involves a decision by the Employment Tribunal which discussed aggravated and exemplary damages. In this particular case, the High Court struck down the aggravated and exemplary damages awards, but in doing so reviewed with approval a significant body of English case law. Deemster Rosen explained the distinction between the two: “The question of exemplary damages was to be distinguished from aggravated damages; where the damage to be awarded at compensation may be aggravated by the particular way in which the defendant had behaved towards the plaintiff. Exemplary damages is not compensation, it is a form of punishment made in favour of the victim to mark the misconduct as falling within the established categories for such an award” (para.54).

It should be stressed that these proceedings are civil ones, intended not to punish the party being sued, but to secure compensation for the loss of the party suing, in this case Dr Ranson. Civil remedies, unlike criminal sentences, do not take as a starting point punishment of wrongdoing. This is the case even for aggravated damages awarded for heinous conduct by a state body (see Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Shaw [2012] IRLR 291). There is, however, an exceptional category of “exemplary damages”, and in Sutton v Creechurch Deemster Rosen cited approvingly decisions of the English House of Lords on aggravated and exemplary damages. The leading English case is Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2001] UKHL. There are a number of different speeches from the Law Lords, but from that of Lord Nicholls:

“The availability of exemplary damages has played a significant role in buttressing civil liberties, in claims for false imprisonment and wrongful arrest. From time to time cases do arise where awards of compensatory damages are perceived as inadequate to achieve a just result between the parties. The nature of the defendant’s conduct calls for a further response from the courts. On occasion conscious wrongdoing by a defendant is so outrageous, his disregard of the claimant’s rights so contumelious, that something more is needed to show that the law will not tolerate such behaviour. Without an award of exemplary damages, justice will not have been done. Exemplary damages, as a remedy of last resort, fill what otherwise would be a regrettable lacuna.” (para.63).

 The scope of exemplary damages is contested, but even the narrow view based on the House of Lords decision in Rookes v Barnard (no.1) would make exemplary damages potentially suitable in the case of “oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of government”.

Costs.

The disclosure hearing can also go to decisions as to costs. How do costs work in proceedings before an EET? Normally, the EET must not make a costs order (EET Rules 2018 as amended, rule 40(2)), but it may do so if the EET finds that one of a number of conditions has been met. These include if the other party has “acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably”, or “has made a false or exaggerated allegation in his or her complaint or response or in evidence in support of it”, or “has been in breach of any order” (rule 40(3)). The EET can also make a wasted costs order against a party’s representative (which includes an advocate) where costs were incurred “as a result of any improper, unreasonable, or negligent act or omission on the part of any representative” (rule 41(3)).

The broader implications.

One of the key themes in Deemster Corlett’s judgement was that the EET needed to do all that was needed to run its case properly, but no more. I think it is fair to say that he sees the EET as refining its approach – and its expression –  over the summer to do just that, and the EET stresses that is the function of its current hearings. Does this mean the case is only important to the parties?

Given that Dr Ranson is seeking, as part of the remedy in a case where liability has already been found, exemplary damages and a cost order, it seems likely that the EET will need to express a finding on significant issues of governance – not as a quasi-public inquiry, but to resolve the case before it. I am not going to seek to predict the finding of facts by the EET, but because of the way the action is structured particular findings of fact may be framed as showing or not showing “oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of government” (in relation to exemplary damages) or that the DHSC “acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively” (in relation to costs), or that their legal representatives committed an “improper, unreasonable, or negligent act or omission” (in relation to wasted costs, which may not be a live issue in the case). It is possible to imagine a set of findings of fact which was reassuring as to broader governance issues. It is also possible to imagine a set of findings of fact which were not.

In this series of blogs on nominations of outsiders to the Legislative Council I focussed, respectively, on profession, public service, Manxness and regionality and personality traits.  In this final blog I will seek to bring these threads together.

The paradigm nominee.

Firstly, what is the paradigm nominee? It should be stressed that the survey has considered all non-MHKs/sitting MLCs nominated for the Legislative Council since 1962. Combining these nominees gives us a decent amount of data to look at, but inevitably will be focussed on the long term picture, rather than current trends.

That reservation made, the paradigm nominee for Legislative Council would be:

• A man, although this is much less paradigmatic as we get nearer to the present. Over the entire period, only 18 of the 63 nominees, or a little under 30%, have been women.
• A professional, or retired professional, working in “Business, Media, and Public Service”.
• A person with a record of public service, typically including a career in the public sector, service in local government, or work for a charity.
• A long term resident of the Isle of Man, ideally having been raised on the Isle of Man, or raising their own children on the Island.
• An extrovert engaged with the external world, with a breadth of interests, high group visibility, and enthusiasm; ideally combined with a passion for the proposed role, or work that they could do in the role.
• A conscientious and honest person of integrity.
• A team player able to challenge members of the team.
• An intelligent person with the ability to carry out critical analysis.

Focussing on successful nominees.

Would this paradigm change if we focussed on successful nominees? This is a much smaller group – 13 have been appointed to the Legislative Council from outside Tynwald, so a little over 20% of all such candidates who have been nominated. Care needs to be taken in giving too much weight to what appear to be differences between two small groups.

The paradigm above is largely a good description of successful nominees too. Successful nominees are similarly described as from a professional career background, similarly extroverts with passion, similarly conscientious and honest, similarly team players able to challenge the team, and similarly intelligent and critical.

While successful nominees remained mainly men, the gap between men and women is much smaller when we focus on successful nominees. At 5 of the 13 (or a little under 40%), this gap is half the size of that for nominees; and, as with the nominees, has seen significant improvement over time. So, given the changes I have already identified over time in the nomination pool, if we look at successful nomination to refine the paradigm, I think it would be fair to replace “A man” with “A person”.

Turning to public service, the paradigm successful nominee looks a little different from the nominee pool more broadly, more like a person with a record of public service, typically involving work with or for a charity or other civil society organisation, or work with a government agency. 12 of the 13 successful nominations included reference to public service, a theme which we have already seen as very common in nominations generally.  The basis for a public service claim was very varied, but the most common claims were around involvement with governmental agencies including tribunals (5), charities (4), sports or hobby clubs (3), and Manx cultural associations (3).  In contrast with nominations as a whole, reference to careers in the public sector were comparatively less common than in nominations generally – 2 of the 13, so 15%, as opposed to 33% of the nominations generally. Also much less well represented in successful nominations was involvement in local government – 1 of the 13, so 8%, as opposed to 28% of the nominations generally.

Finally, turning to Manxness, I suggested that nominations seemed to emphasise a civic nationalism view of Manxness, with long-term residence being key. For successful nominees, long term residence remained a common marker, but descriptions as of Manx ancestry or Manx birth were substantially more common in successful nominees (7 of 13, or 54%) than nominees generally (14 of 63, or 22%).

Causes for concern?

It is easy to see why most of the elements of this paradigm are in play, but it does raise three possible areas of concern.

Firstly, I flagged earlier the mismatch between the proportion of the Manx workforce working as professionals in Business, Media and Public Service, and their representation in nominations to the Legislative Council. If we were to ignore the professional part of the paradigm, and focus on the other elements, would much be lost? In other words, is the nomination pool making enough use of people who otherwise fit the paradigm but are from other work backgrounds?  Sustained experience, and leadership of, civil society organisations such as charities, pressure groups, and trade unions might provide strong evidence of other aspects of the paradigm.

Secondly, the dual deployment of a career in the public sector as both professional background and public service could be seen as privileging those with public sector careers over those with private sector careers. Looking at the admittedly small number of successful nominees, however, it seems that MHKs are less accepting of the link between public sector careers and public service when voting than when making nominations.

Finally, there does seem to be a difference between the paradigm nominee’s Manxness (which is mainly based on long-term residence), and the successful nominee’s Manxness (which although substantially based on long-term residence, has a larger element of ancestry or birth). Generally, an emphasis on ancestry or place of birth is seen as problematic – for instance race, which includes ethnic or national origins, is a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2017 (see Equality Act 2017 s.10). It should be reiterated, however, that the pool of successful nominees is so small, and the importance of individual personality and characteristics so obvious, that any difference in ideas of Manxness between nomination and vote may well be illusory.

The next round of MLC elections.

Looking forward, what sort of people might we expect to see being put forward for the Legislative Council? I would anticipate seeing substantial number of women and men described in their nominations as:

• People with a record of public service, typically including a career in the public sector, service in local government, or work for a charity or community group; perhaps with an increased emphasis on the latter.
• Long term residents of the Isle of Man.
• Passionate extroverts.
• Conscientious and honest people.
• Team players able to challenge members of the team.
• Intelligent persons with the ability to carry out critical analysis.

I also anticipate significant numbers of professionals, or retired professionals, especially those working in “Business, Media and Public Service”. It would be good to see them joined in the process by those from other work backgrounds.

In my earlier blogs on nominations of outsider to the Legislative Council I focussed, respectively, on profession, public service, and Manxness and regionality. A fair criticism is that these categories are only indicators that the nominee possesses traits which make them suitable to be an MLC – that is, that their personality and experience shows they are the right person for the job.

Experience is, I think, entirely subsumed in the earlier discussions – a nominee whose profession is referred to is not being nominated because they are an advocate, for instance, but because of the experience that has given them, and the skills they have developed. Personality, however, is more complex.

Personality is an area of increasing academic study, and within that a thriving subfield is the personality (and perceived personality) of politicians. Scholars have argued that personality – as opposed to ideology – is becoming more important even countries with an entrenched system of party politics. Aicholzer and Willman, for instance, suggest in their open access journal article that:

“Just as ideology represents the long-term and stable underpinnings of parties, personality traits are long-term and stable psychological characteristics that govern individuals’ and politicians’ consistent patterns of values, attitudes, and ultimately behavior (Caprara & Vecchione, 2017). A candidate’s personality traits can therefore be used as a short-cut by voters to assess what candidates are going to do during their term in office (i.e., ideological leanings) and how they are going to do it (i.e., conduct in office)”

If personality, or rather voters’ perception of personality, is becoming more important in large democracies, it has always been central to small democracies such as the Isle of Man. In a very useful comparative study of four such democracies, Veenendaal, again in an open journal access article, concludes that even in the three case-study countries which have an established party system, they “appear[ed] to exist as vehicles in support of individual politicians”. He argues that “the existence of parties conceals and misrepresents the genuine nature of political contestation in microstates, which is essentially based on personal instead of ideological premises”. So, personality is well worth looking at.

Aicholzer and Willman use six categories of personality traits in their analysis – what are commonly referred to as the Big Five (openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism), supplemented by a trait from an alternative taxonomy, that of “honesty-humility”. They find that, at least in the groups they studied, voters preferred candidates with high levels of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion and honesty, but low levels of agreeableness and neuroticism.

We can take these six traits as categories for nominations to the Legislative Council, and map onto them every explicit reference to a personality trait (as opposing to subtler messages about personality traits that a nominator may be putting forward by referring to say a career in the police). Not every nomination makes reference to such a trait, but the majority do (only 8 not referring to a personality trait of some kind).

The most common traits identified fell within “extraversion”, which we can very roughly describe as pronounced engagement with the external world, which can involve enjoying interacting with people, having a breadth of interests, high group visibility, and enthusiasm. 26 nominations referred to this in one way or another.

The next most common traits identified fell within conscientiousness, with exactly that word frequently being adopted. 23 nominations referred to this.

The next most common traits identified fell within honesty-humility, frequently being described as integrity. 22 nominations referred to this.

The last category I want to talk about using Aicholzer and Willman’s six traits is agreeableness. Broadly speaking, agreeable individuals value getting along with others, while low agreeableness individuals are often competitive or challenging people. 26 nominations described the nominee in ways consistent with high agreeableness, while 11 described the nominee in ways consistent with low agreeableness. At times the nominating MHK described the same nominee in both ways – for instance the nomination of Paul Beckett. What is going on?

I think the best explanation is that nominations reflect the complexity of the role of MLC. If I may steal a phrase, being part of “Team Tynwald” requires an ability to work constructively as part of a team for common goals; and being a member of the national legislature requires an ability to recognise the importance of the nation, and of society. At the same time, being an MLC – particular when the emphasis is on the Legislative Council as a scrutiny body at times challenging an established point of view – requires scepticism, a willingness to challenge, and at times a willingness to challenge without substantial support from others. Nominations seek to portray the candidate as agreeable, but not too agreeable; as disagreeable, but not too disagreeable. If agreeableness is rated more highly by MHKs than by the voters in elections studied by Aicholzer and Willman, this could be seen as a pragmatic response to members of “Team Tynwald” appointing new members to their team; members with whom they will have to work.

Using this established set of traits is interesting. I was a little surprised to find honesty-humility was not even more broadly deployed in nominations.  Perhaps, like lack of neuroticism (no mentions), it was something that was often taken as read. We should, however, recognise that any attempt to map the range of human personality traits onto a small number of discrete categories is going to lose something – perhaps much – in translation. Gorbaniuk and his colleagues question the value of the Big Five, and instead argue that “research on the structure of politicians’ perceived personality traits should be conducted for each country separately. The specificity of a particular country, its culture, and its political scence may plan an important role in this respect”. The psycholexical method they use for their study of the Ukraine is extremely impressive, and could work well in the unique context of the Manx MLC process, but is not something for a lone scholar to attempt. Nonetheless, their scepticism about their general, and their interest in the particular, led me to keep an eye open for traits which were commonly mentioned, but which did not necessarily fit easily or transparently into a six trait model. Two additional traits are worth mentioning.

Firstly, intelligence (24) and the ability to be critical (19) were frequently mentioned by nominators. Given the emphasis on the Legislative Council as a scrutiny chamber preceded the move towards appointing outsiders as MLCs, this is unsurprising.

Secondly, and something more of a surprise, passion was a recurring theme in a minority of nominations, appearing 18 times. Sometimes this was in the abstract, at other times it was associated with passion for the role, or as passion for a particular agenda (for instance preservation of the Manx environment, or equality, or human rights).

In the next blog, I will bring the different threads in these blogs together to identify the paradigm nominee for the Legislative Council and – more of a reach – the paradigm successful nominee.

Together with Teale Phelps Bondaroff, I wrote a long blog post on the changes to prayers in the House of Keys. Available on the excellent Law & Religion UK blog here .