Is refusing Royal Assent to the Assisted Dying Bill a constitutional crisis?

The short answer is no. But this is because of the basis for the refusal, and exactly what has been done by the UK government, so it is worth giving the long answer.

Why does an Act of Tynwald need Royal Assent, and who gives it?

Historically, every Act of Tynwald needed the support of Tynwald (in some centuries, a fairly amorphous concept), and the assent of the King, later Lord, of Mann. With the vesting of the rights of the Lord of Mann in the UK Crown, this came to be exercised by the sovereign of the UK – whether by virtue of their title as Lord of Mann or as UK sovereign is a matter that need not delay us. In practice, since 1981 many Acts of Tynwald receive Royal Assent from the Lieutenant-Governor, rather than directly from the UK Crown.

In the UK, Royal Assent to an Act of Parliament is formally by Charles III as a “personal prerogative”, but in constitutional  practice he will always do so. In the UK context, there has been controversy over whether the Crown could refuse assent when required to by the UK Government – rather than their own judgment – but the consensus is probably that expressed by Paul Evans in 2019:

“in all foreseeable circumstances short of a revolution (or counter-revolution perhaps) there is no executive veto in the British constitution over legislation after it has been agreed by parliament”.

The Manx position is very different. There is no internal executive veto. The Council of Ministers has no authority to direct the Lieutenant-Governor, or the Crown, to give or withhold consent to an Act of Tynwald. Instead, there is an extremely long history of Bills passed by Tynwald being refused Royal Assent by the Crown acting on the advice of their United Kingdom ministers.

When can UK ministers withhold Royal Assent?

As with many constitutional issues, there is a difference between the legal rule, and the constitutional rule. The legal rule is that the Crown may withhold Royal Assent upon any ground, and the UK Government may advise the Crown to do so on any grounds. The constitutional rule, however, is rather narrower. As with many issues touching on Manx autonomy, the further back you go, the more willing the English/British/UK authorities were to intervene in Manx affairs.

There are numerous examples from the 19th century of a prospective Act of Tynwald being refused Royal Assent simply because the UK government thought it should not become law. This might be because the Bill was seen as badly drafted (such as the Petty Sessions Bill 1864), or because it introduced rules different from English law. My favourite example is the 1849 Bill to reduce the scope of capital punishment, which was rejected because “it [was] an important departure from the law of England”.

With the changing understanding of the relationship between the Isle of Man and the UK, and in particular of the autonomy of a democratic Tynwald, this and other grounds have fallen away. Today, the “strong presumption” (Barclay v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] UKSC 54 para.16) and almost invariable practice is that a Bill passed by Tynwald should receive Royal Assent – the Manx Attorney General advises the (UK) Ministry of Justice they have no objection to the Bill being passed into law, the Ministry of Justice then advises the Lieutenant-Governor that they may use their powers to grant Royal Assent. Two grounds for exceptional intervention seem to have survived – “fundamental constitutional principles” and compliance with international law.

The “fundamental constitutional principle” ground risks being interpreted very broadly. In 1855 a Bill to provide for the speedy capture of sheep stealers was refused Assent “in consequence of their Lordships having been advised that its leading principle was contrary to the tenets of British jurisprudence”.  Today, it is likely to be interpreted narrowly. An extremely rare example, from the Channel Islands, concerned constitutional reform in Sark.  In 2008 Royal Assent for a measure to create a new democratic legislature for Sark was refused on the basis that it was “inconsistent with basic democratic principles, some of which were set out in the European Convention on Human Rights”. When a revised law was resubmitted by Sark, the Lord Chancellor judged it to be acceptable and recommended it for Royal Assent, which it duly received. As with other aspects of the ultimate responsibility of the UK Crown for good government in the Isle of Man, it is likely only to refer to extreme situations such as “a fundamental breakdown in public order or of the rule of law, endemic corruption in the government or the judiciary or other extreme circumstance”

The other ground, and the one upon which I read Royal Assent being refused here, is that the legislation would put the UK in violation of its international legal obligations. The Isle of Man, although increasingly active on the international legal stage in the 21st century, is not a sovereign state. International obligations applicable to the territory of the Isle of Man are obligations of the UK. So, for instance, when Tyrer was judicially birched in the Isle of Man this was by Manx officials executing a sentence passed by a Manx court under a Manx statute – but the violation of international law was by the UK.

When would withholding Royal Assent have been a constitutional crisis?

As I say, in law, the Crown could withhold Assent for any reason. If Royal Assent had been withheld simply because the UK Government did not share the view of Tynwald as to what an assisted dying law should consist of, however, that would have been such a substantial reversal of the growth of Manx autonomy as to trigger a constitutional crisis. Given that the UK has been wrestling with assisted dying legislation at the same time as Royal Assent was being considered, it was reasonable to worry that this was the basis for the drawn out process of giving Royal Assent, signalling an approach to Manx legislation which was “paternalistic and unnecessary” .

From the limited data currently in the public domain, as indicated by the Chief Minister in March, that has not happened here. Instead, Royal Assent has been withheld under the international obligations ground. The Cabinet Office press release stresses this basis for refusal of assent:

“The Ministry of Justice duly consulted with the Isle of Man Government, seeking clarity on the proposed arrangements for the independent monitoring of assisted deaths, safeguards against coercion, and ensuring that individuals have the capacity to make informed decisions regarding assisted dying.

The consultation culminated in the Isle of Man Government providing comprehensive assurances outlining a number of commitments intended to address the issues raised. While these commitments would, if fully implemented, mitigate the legal risk significantly, they do not form part of the Bill.

It is therefore the UK Government’s view that these matters must be addressed directly on the face of the Bill to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights.

It is on this basis that the Ministry of Justice is unable to recommend the Bill for Royal Assent at this time”.

Royal Assent, then, has been withheld on the basis of the need to meet the international legal obligations of the UK under the European Convention on Human Rights. From earlier discussions shared by the Minister for Health and Social Care, a particular concern is to ensure that the obligations under the ECHR as interpreted in Mortier v Belgium are met. These same obligations were considered by the UK DHSC in relation to the English Bill to allow assisted dying, which discussed the safeguards in the English Bill at length, concluding that the English Bill met ECHR obligations.

Although this sort of issue is normally dealt with before a Bill is considered for Royal Assent, it is not a constitutional innovation, nor the basis for a constitutional crisis, for a Bill passed by Tynwald to be refused Royal Assent because it is incompatible with the international legal obligations of the UK. So long as the UK is responsible for Manx violations of international law, this ground for refusing Royal Assent seems inevitable. To quote Lady Hale from Barclay (para. 48):

“It is the clear responsibility of the United Kingdom government in international law to ensure that the Islands comply with such international obligations as apply to them. Just as the United Kingdom Parliament has the constitutional right to legislate for the Islands, even without their consent, on such matters, so must the United Kingdom executive have the constitutional power to ensure that proposed Island legislation is also compliant. As was pointed out in evidence to the Kilbrandon Commission, to hold otherwise would be to assign responsibility to the United Kingdom without the power to put that responsibility into effect”.

Bonus constitutional crisis averted: A disallowance power?

The actual correspondence from the Ministry of Justice is not available, but it is referred to in the Cabinet Office press release which announced the withholding of Assent. There it was said:

“This should not be interpreted as disallowing Royal Assent; nor does it prejudge the policy merits of assisted dying. It reflects solely the need to ensure that the legislation once enacted contains the necessary protections required under the European Convention on Human Rights”.

My best guess is that the reference to “disallowing” here is to make the objection to the legislation as it currently stands, rather than all assisted dying legislation, clear. As with Sark in 2008, a Bill which addresses the concerns of the Ministry of Justice would receive Assent. Unfortunately, “disallowance” has a very specific technical meaning which it would be unfortunate to see become a live part of the Manx constitutional landscape.

As a general rule of Imperial constitutional law, the Crown was able to disallow the legislation of dominion legislatures, other than the Imperial Parliament. Because Acts of Tynwald after 1765 required the assent of the British Crown, refusal of Royal Assent was occasionally referred to, inaccurately, as disallowance. Disallowance proper, by which is meant the negation of an Act of the national legislature by a later Order in Council deriving authority from the prerogative, rather than an Act of Parliament, is very different. When Royal Assent is refused, a key part of the legislative process has not been completed – there is no national law. A disallowance power, on the other hand, is exercised to negate a piece of national law which has been passed – as we find, for instance, in the Australian Constitution s.59.

I am aware of only one example of a disallowance power being exercised in relation to the Isle of Man, and it is both elderly – dating to 1900 – and ambiguous. The Companies Act 1900 had passed all stages of legislation “and the Order in Council [had] actually been made approving it, and … [was] … lying in the [Home Office]” when objections were first raised. These were sufficiently persuasive to render the Act undesirable, and the question arose as to whether it could be annulled. K. Digby noted: “We can find no precedents of a revocation of an Order in Council with reference to Isle of Man legislation but there are abundant cases of alteration and variation of other Orders in Council”. The Manx and English Law Officers agreed that the Act could properly be dealt with, since it had not been promulgated and so was not law, by the Order granting assent being repealed by another Order. Even this single precedent leaves open the question of whether an Act of Tynwald could be disallowed after it had become law which, given the changes in the law relating to promulgation, now means after Royal Assent has been granted.

If disallowance is being used in the broad sense, it is not describing anything objectionable. If it is being used in this more technical sense – suggesting that reassurance was needed that an Order in Council, as opposed to an Act of Parliament, would not in this case be used to repeal an Act of Tynwald – then it is much more problematic.

So what next with the Assisted Dying Bill?

The proposer, Alex Allinson, has already begun work to bring forward amendments to the Bill to address the points raised by the Ministry of Justice. There is one, calendar driven, problem here.

Refusal of Royal Assent is not unheard of, and so the Manx legislative process specifically accommodates changes of Bills to make “such amendments … as the House [of Keys] may consider desirable in respect of such suggestions” (House of Keys Standing Orders, 4.16). The amended Bill then needs to be considered by the Legislative Council, as normal. The General Election to the House of Keys this September means there is a time constraint on getting this done. When the House of Keys is dissolved – on the 13th of August 2026 – all Bills before the House lapse (House of Keys Standing Orders 4.26(3)). If a Bill awaiting Royal Assent has been passed by the House of Keys, and the Legislative Council, and signed in Tynwald, it may receive Royal Assent after the dissolution of the House. If it has not, it will lapse, and must be reintroduced to the House of Keys as if it were a new Bill (House of Keys Standing Orders 2.26(5)). If a Bill has passed the Branches, it would be normal to sign it in the last sitting of Tynwald Court before the General Election, so that if Royal Assent is given, it will become law without further action by Tynwald.

Are there fewer new Acts of Tynwald than there used to be?

With Tynwald Day coming up, the list of Acts to be promulgated on Tynwald Day has now been published. Five Acts will be read.

By customary law, an Act of Tynwald did not become law until after it had been promulgated – that is, read in full in both English and Manx from Tynwald Hill. This was not always on Tynwald Day however – of the 89 Acts promulgated in the 1700s, for instance, only 46 were promulgated on Tynwald Day. The amount of information that had to be read out was reduced by statute during the 19th century. By the late 19th century Lieutenant-Governors had become reluctant to promulgate other than on Tynwald Day; which obviously made the delay between a measure receiving Royal Assent and being capable of becoming law potentially substantial. Initially introduced as an emergency provision during World War One, since 1916 Acts of Tynwald have become law upon receiving Royal Assent, although unless promulgated within 18 months, the Act will later lapse. The detail is now governed by the Legislation Act 2015 s.8-16.

Five Acts for an 18 month period does not seem a very large number, which raises the question – are there fewer new Acts of Tynwald than there used to be? Before answering that, a few caveats.

Firstly, the structure of Acts has changed consideably over the centuries. For instance a single Act promulgated in 1661 covered civil actions for debt, inheritance rights, taking of turf and ling at night, and punishing provoking words and batteries with fines. A modern Act would be unlikely to cover so many unrelated issues in a single piece of legislation. So taking too long a view on this question could be misleading. Secondly, any quantitative approach to legislation, while increasingly seen as useful to understand the work of a legislature, needs to be approached with care. Not all Acts of Tynwald are of equal reach and significance; and the same can be said for each clause within an Act. Thirdly, Tynwald does not legislate in a vacuumn, but frequently is responding to a perceived need. At periods of rapid crisis, for instance war, economic collapse, or pandemic, one would not be surprised to see either very wide ranging legislation, or an increased volume of legislation, as the legislature plays its part.

All of that said, a review of the number of Acts passed each year since 2001 does suggest that the period since the last General Election in September 2021 has been one in which comparatively little primary legislation has been passed.

2021 itself saw a spike, with 24 Acts of Tynwald being passed that year. This reflects, however, the work of the previously constituted House of Keys. Of the 24 Acts, 15 had received Royal Assent before the General Election. The remaining 9 received Royal Assent after the General Election, but had left Tynwald before the General Election. Thus, this 24 was not the product of the House of Keys elected in September 2021.

The Assisted Dying Bill as it enters the Legislative Council.

The Assisted Dying Bill enters the Legislative Council on 22 October 2024. As I have noted elsewhere, as the second chamber of Tynwald, the Council has the power to reject, or requirement amendments to, draft legislation which has been passed by the democratically elected Keys. The passage through the Legislative Council is not a formality. What does the Bill entering the Council look like – in particular, how does it differ from the Bill first introduced into the Keys?

Clause 4 continues to provide that a person who is terminally ill may request and lawfully be provided with assistance to end their own life.  There are two significant changes. Firstly, the definition of “clear and settled intention” is restricted within the text of this section. The new cl.4(2)(b) now reads “has a clear and settled intention to end their own life reached voluntarily without coercion or duress and having been informed about the person’s diagnosis and prognosis and the treatments available, including pain control and palliative care”. Secondly, the period during which a person must have been ordinarily resident in the Island has increased from one year to five years. The Department is also not only able to, but is required to, specify the meaning of “ordinarily resident”.

Along with Dr Burin, I had raised concerns over the potential impacts of a one year residence requirement, and suggested looking to Australian law, in particular the law of Queensland. The Queensland assisted dying regime has a residency requirement – twelve months – but the ability to issue a formal exemption “if the person has a substantial connection to Queensland” and “there are compassionate grounds for granting the exemption”. The current regime would exclude a person who had become ordinarily resident in the Isle of Man for reasons unconnected with assisted dying, and then three years later discovers they are terminally ill. It would also exclude those with a substantial connection to the Isle of Man, where there are compassionate grounds for granting an exemption. Consider for instance an adult child who had grown up in the Isle of Man, moved to the Isle of Man, and discovers they have a life limiting condition which is likely to lead to their death in four years. They return to the parental home on the Isle of Man for care a year later, and become ordinarily resident at that point. They will not be able to access the assisted dying regime. The Queensland exemption was well worth considering in relation to a one year residency requirement, but even more so for a five year one.

The definition of terminal illness under clause 5 is changed. Formerly, a person reasonably expected to die within six months could make use of the statutory regime; but in the new Bill this entitlement applies to a person who is expected to die within twelve months.

Clause 6 deals with the requirements of the formal declaration that the person wishes to access assisted dying. Formerly, the declaration could not be witnessed by a relative, or a person directly involved in the declarers care or treatment. The broader definition of relative under the current Bill will increase the range of people who cannot act as witnesses: now including “a person living together with that person as if they were spouses or civil partners” and stepchildren. There is a new reason for excluding a potential witness: “someone who knows they will gain financially in the event of the person’s death (whether directly or indirectly and whether in money or money’s worth)” (clause 6(1)(a)(iii)). The two doctors countersigning the declaration remain required to be satisfied, inter alia, that the person has reached their decision “voluntarily, on an informed basis and without coercion or duress” (clause 6(7)(c)). They remain able to consult a psychiatrist on the capacity of the declaring person, but no provision is made for support on determining lack of coercion. They are now required to satisfy themselves that the declarer “has been fully informed of the palliative, hospice and other care which is available” (clause 6(11)).

Clause 7 deals with the actual provision of assistance in dying. A requirement has been added that before dispensing and delivering an approved substance to end their life, a doctor must re-examine the person and their medical records and confirm that they continue to wish to end their own life (clause 7(3)(b)).  An important change in clause 7 relates to physician administration of the approved substance. Under the original Bill, a doctor could administer the approved substance if requested (see former clause 7(7)). The current Bill “does not authorise an assisting health professional to administer an approved substance to another person with the intention of causing that person’s death” (clause 7(6)). The current version of the Bill, then, legalises assisted dying through preparing the substance for self-administration, or preparing a medical device which will allow the person to self-administer, or “assist[ing] that person to ingest or otherwise self-administer the approved substance” (clause 7(5)); but does not legalise administration by the doctor themself. This moves the legislation out of the area of murder per se, and the alterations to the criminal code in relation to murder have been removed (formerly in clause 10(2)).

The brief conscientious objection clause in clause 8 has been substantially expanded. Clause 8(2) makes it clear that a conscientious objection to involvement in assisted dying does not exclude referral to another health care professional – clause 8(2) is not well drafted, with an ambiguous “may nevertheless refer” which, in the light of clause 8(5) might have been intended to read as “may nevertheless be required to refer”. Clause 8(4) provides for how a conscientious objection is to be proved – a statement in writing and on oath or affirmation is conclusive evidence of their objection – an adoption of the Manx Abortion Reform Act 2019 s.8(3) that we had recommended.

Clause 9 adds a new “intention to participate” status. A medical professional who intends to exercise functions under the Act must notify the Department of their intention to do so, and ensure they have received all appropriate guidance and training before exercising any such functions (clause 9(1)). The Department must create and maintain a register for those who have this status, and the details of the register (including for instance the content and who can access it) are left to regulations by the Department (clause 9(3-4)). A person who has notified the Department and received the appropriate training is protected by a conscience clause (clause 9(5)). A person who has notified the Department, but not completed the training is not, however, protected. Is this an appropriate distinction – that is, should conscience protection depend upon having taken mandated training?

Clause 10 replaces a former ban on health care professionals initiating discussions on professional dying with a requirement for the Department to provide “such guidance and training to health care professionals as it considers appropriate to assist health care professionals in preparing for  discussions about the range of palliative, hospice and other care which may be available to a terminally ill person, including the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act” (clause 10(1)).

Monitoring of the new regime has been substantially relaxed. The former clause required an annual report on the operation of the Act, such reports being required annually. The new clause requires the publication of a single “report on the operation of the Act after the Act has been in operation for 2 years” (clause 14(1)(b)). So monitoring has become for a transitional period, rather than an open-ended process. Against that, there is reference to “any independent monitoring panel” which may suggest a different mechanism for monitoring (clause 14(2)(a)).

Clause 15 deals with criminal offences, and expands the ways in which an offence can be committed under the Act from the original two (see original clause 14(1)(a), 14(1)(b) and 14(2)) by adding the following:

Clause 15(3) criminalise any person who wilfully ignores or otherwise conceals knowledge of a revocation of their declaration by a person who had made a declaration under the assisted dying regime. This is the mirror image of the existing offence of concealing or destroying a declaration (which is retained under clause 15(1)(b)).

Clause 15(4) criminalises any person who coerces or pressures (or attempts to coerce or pressure) a terminally ill person into making a declaration under section 6. This offence can be punished by up to 14 years in prison (clause 15(6)), rather than the usual 5 years in relation to most other offences in this section (clause 15(7) but see clause 15(5)). I have two reservations about this offence as it currently stands.

Firstly, it addresses coercion or pressure only one way – there is no offence under the Bill of coercing or pressuring a person not to make a declaration, or to withdraw a declaration once made.

Secondly, there is no explicit limit on how far this serious offence reaches. In particular, there is no discussion of the mental element of the accused. The Domestic Abuse Act 2020 s.36  creates an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour, which requires that “A knows or ought to have known that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B” (s.36(1)(d)). It also provides a defence for conduct where A believed they were acting in B’s best interests, and “the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable” (s.36(4)(b)). It may be that Manx courts would read these sorts of issues into their definition of “coerces or pressures”, to exclude reasonable or unthinking conduct from the term, but this might be worth doing in the legislation itself: the mens rea requirement for an offence with a 14 year maximum penalty would be better on the face of the publicly available Act.